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Abstract
The security of quantum exam [Phys. Lett. A 350 (2006) 174] is analyzed and it is
found that this protocol is secure for any eavesdropper except for the “students”
who take part in the exam. Specifically, any student can steal other examinees’
solutions and then cheat in the exam. Furthermore, a possible improvement of this
protocol is presented.
Key words: quantum cryptography, cryptanalysis, entanglement
PACS: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd
Cryptography is the approach to assure the secrecy of the data which is stored
or communicated in public environment. From its beginning the research of
cryptography has been progressed along two directions in parallel. One direc-
tion deals with the design of various schemes to maintain privacy. The other
is focused on analyzing the security of existing protocols, trying to find the
flaws in cryptosystems and improve them. Both directions are necessary to
the development of cryptography. It is also the case in quantum cryptogra-
phy [1,2,3], where the work of both scheme designing (e.g. [4] and references
therein) and security analyzing (e.g. [5,6,7,8]) is continually proposed.
In a recent paper [9] a novel protocol called quantum exam was proposed. In
this protocol a teacher Alice wants to organize an exam with her remotely
separated students Bob 1, Bob 2, ... and Bob N . As in a classical exam,
all the problems and Bobs’ solutions should not be leaked out and, more
importantly, any Bob cannot obtain other examinees’ solutions. However, we
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find that the later confidentiality constraint is not perfectly satisfied. That is,
a dishonest Bob can cheating in the exam. In this Letter we demonstrate this
hidden trouble and then present a possible improvement of the quantum exam
protocol.
Let us introduce the quantum exam first. In fact there are two similar quantum
exam protocols presented in Ref.[9]. We will take the first one (i.e., the so-called
absolutely secure protocol) as our example. For simplicity we use the same
notations as that in Ref.[9]. The whole protocol is a little complicated and here
we only describe briefly the related part, that is, the solution-collecting part
(including the entanglement-sharing process). In this stage Alice generates a
large enough number of ordered nonidentical states
|Φp〉ap1p...Np =
1√
2
(|0s1ps2p...sNp〉ap1p...Np + |1s1ps2p...sNp〉ap1p...Np), (1)
where snp = 0 or 1, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N , and snp = snp ⊕ 1 (⊕ denotes an addition
mod 2). Note that the value of snp is known only to Alice. For each |Φp〉 Alice
stores qubit ap and sends qubits 1p, 2p, ..., Np to Bob 1, Bob 2, ..., Bob N ,
respectively. Afterwards, Alice selects a subset of the entangled states {|Φl〉}
to detect eavesdropping. More concretely, for each |Φl〉, Alice measures the
qubit al randomly in the basis Bz or Bx and informs every Bob to perform the
same measurement on his corresponding qubit. Then they check the security
of the entanglement distribution process by verifying
jzal = δ0,snlj
z
nl
+ δ1,snl (j
z
nl
⊕ 1) (2)
for every n = 1, 2, ..., N (when Bz was used) or
jxal =
N∏
n=1
jxnl (3)
(when Bx was used), where j represents the measurement result, j
z
al
(jznl) ={0, 1} corresponding to obtaining {|0〉, |1〉} and jxal(jxnl) = {+1,−1} corre-
sponding to obtaining {|+〉, |−〉}. If there is no eavesdropping detected, the
shared entanglement can be used for solution-collecting some time later. When
needed, Alice and Bobs measure the remaining ordered |Φp〉-states {|Φm〉am1m...Nm}
in basis Bz and record the outcomes as the secure keys. Let {jzam} and {jznm}
denote the keys belonging to Alice and Bob n, respectively. Every Bob uses his
key as a one-time-pad to encrypt his solution and sends it to Alice. With the
knowledge of jzam and snm Alice can obtain each Bob’s key [see Eq.(2)]. Con-
sequently, at the end of the exam Alice will correctly decrypt Bobs’ messages
and obtain every Bob’s solution.
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It can be seen that the solution-collecting process comprises mainly a multi-
partite quantum key distribution (MQKD) scheme. Because the one-time-pad
is perfectly secure here, the security of the whole process lies on that of the
key distribution. As we know, the state |Φp〉ap1p...Np has a property of positive
parity, i.e., jxap
∏N
n=1 j
x
np
= +1. This wonderful property is subtly employed
to detect eavesdropping in the quantum exam protocol [see Eq.(3)]. As a re-
sult, the two constraints Eqs.(2) and (3) can make the exam secure against
various kinds of attacks [9]. However, we take notice of another property of
|Φp〉ap1p...Np, that is, one can entangle an ancilla |0〉 into the multipartite en-
tangled state by a controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation and then disentangle it
out from the obtained state by another CNOT operation. The control qubits
of the two CNOT operations can be any two qubits in |Φp〉ap1p...Np and the
target is the ancilla. For example, for a certain p, the multipartite entangled
state and the ancilla compose a composite system
|Γ〉1 = |Φ〉a1...N |0〉g = 1√
2
(|0s1s2...sN 〉a1...N |0〉g + |1s1s2...sN〉a1...N |0〉g),(4)
where the subscript g represents the ancilla. If one performs a CNOT operation
Ckg (the first subscript k denotes the control qubit and the second one g
denotes the target qubit) on the qubit k (1 ≤ k ≤ N) and the ancilla, the
state of the system changes into
|Γ〉2 = 1√
2
(|0s1s2...sN 〉a1...N |sk〉g + |1s1s2...sN〉a1...N |sk〉g). (5)
Now if one performs another CNOT operation Crg on the qubit r (1 ≤ r ≤ N)
and the ancilla, he (she) will obtain
|Γ〉3= 1√
2
(|0s1s2...sN〉a1...N |sk ⊕ sr〉g + |1s1s2...sN 〉a1...N |sk ⊕ sr〉g)
=
1√
2
(|0s1s2...sN〉a1...N |sk ⊕ sr〉g + |1s1s2...sN 〉a1...N |sk ⊕ sr〉g)
= |Φ〉a1...N |sk ⊕ sr〉g. (6)
It can be seen that the ancilla is disentangled out from the multipartite en-
tangled state and, more importantly, the original state |Φ〉a1...N is left alone.
As a result, if an eavesdropper Eve utilizes the above operations to eavesdrop,
she will introduce no errors. Furthermore, when Eve measures the ancilla in
basis Bz she will obtain sk ⊕ sr definitely. Since the value sk ⊕ sr implies, as
described as following, the correlation of the measurement results of qubits k
and r, we call the state |Φ〉a1...N “correlation elicitable”. It can be shown that
this property gives a dishonest Bob the chance to cheat in the exam. Without
loss of generality, suppose the dishonest student is Bob r and he wants to steal
3
Bob k’s solution (maybe Bob k is an outstanding student), he can adopt the
following strategy to achieve his goal.
(i) For each p, Bob r prepares an ancilla |0〉 and performs two CNOT opera-
tions Ckpgp and Crpgp as described above when Alice distributes the multipar-
tite entangled states {|Φp〉ap1p...Np}.
(ii) Bob r measures each ancilla in basis Bz and obtains skp⊕srp with certainty.
(iii) Cooperating with Alice, Bob r executes the legal process to detect eaves-
dropping and get key bits. After the actions (i) and (ii), as analyzed above,
all the carrier states {|Φp〉ap1p...Np} remain unchanged and no disturbance is
introduced. Therefore, Alice cannot detect the eavesdropping and Bob r will
correctly obtain the intended key bits {jzrm}.
(iv) Bob r gains Bob k’s key bits {jzkm} by simple calculation. More specifically,
Bob r deletes the data corresponding to the check states {|Φl〉} from the
bits {skp ⊕ srp}, and obtains the remaining ordered bits {skm ⊕ srm}, which
correspond to the carrier states {|Φm〉am1m...Nm} and the key bits {jzrm}. It
should be emphasized that, for a certain m, the measurement outcomes of the
ancilla skm⊕srm implies the relation between two key bits jzkm and jzrm , that is,
jzkm⊕jzrm = skm⊕srm . [From Eq.(1) we can see that either jzkm = skm, jzrm = srm
or jzkm = skm , j
z
rm
= srm holds.] Therefore, with the knowledge of {skm ⊕ srm}
and {jzrm}, Bob r can easily get the key bits {jzkm} of Bob k by calculating
jzkm = skm ⊕ srm ⊕ jzrm for each m.
(v) Bob r cheats when Alice collects the solutions. Obviously, with the help
of {jzkm}, Bob r can decrypt the message sent from Bob k to Alice and copy
Bob k’s solution at will.
By this strategy, a dishonest student can steal any other examinees’ solutions.
Moreover, the eavesdropping is not difficult to realize because it needs only
facilities similar to that of the legal parties. One may argue that, in the above
example, if Bob r is far away from the quantum channel between Alice and
Bob k he cannot continually perform the two CNOT operations in a certain
time. In fact there is no need to worry about it. Bob r does not need to
take a round trip between his and Bob k’s quantum channels. He can ask his
friend, say Charlie, who stands in Bob k’s channel, to perform the first CNOT
operation Ckpgp and then send the ancilla to him.
There is a fact which should be pointed out. That is, the one who will legally
take part in the protocol is prone to be omitted when we analyze various attack
strategies. In fact, in most MQKD protocols (e.g. quantum secret sharing, see
[10] and references therein), a participant generally has more power to attack
than an outside eavesdropper because the participant can take advantage of
the right to access the carrier state partly and participate in the process of
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eavesdropping detection. We call this kind of attack “participant attack”. In
the quantum exam protocols, as we can see, the eavesdropping result {skm ⊕
srm} does not seem to have much meaning for an outside eavesdropper, but it is
very useful for a participant Bob to eavesdrop further. Therefore, as implied in
Refs.[11,12,13], the main goal for the security of an MQKD should be focused
on preventing the dishonest participant from eavesdropping the information.
Now we discuss how to improve the quantum exam protocol to prevent this
kind of participant attack. To retain the features of the original quantum exam
protocol, our aim is to modify it as little as possible. Since the fundamental
reason of this threat is the speciality of |Φ〉a1...N , i.e., “correlation elicitable”,
Alice can insert some different check qubits to detect the above attack. For
example, before Alice sends the sequences to Bobs, she inserts a certain number
of single qubits into each sequence in random positions. All these single qubits
are randomly in one of the states {|+〉, |−〉} [14]. Note that the positions of the
single qubits in these sequences are different from each other. After all Bobs
received their respective sequences, Alice tells each Bob the positions of these
check qubits and lets him measure them in the basis Bx. Then Alice and Bob
check the identity of these qubits. If the error rate is low enough, they proceed
with other steps in the original protocol to finish the quantum exam. Because,
for the dishonest Bob, both the single qubits and the qubits from |Φ〉a1...N
are in maximally mixed state ρ = 1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|), he cannot distinguish the
check qubits from others. Therefore, when the dishonest Bob wants to cheat
using above strategy, he would introduce errors with probability 1
2
once he
performs a CNOT operation on a certain check qubit and his ancilla. As a
result, the improved protocol can stand against the above participant attack.
Furthermore, the main frame of the original protocol is retained and it follows
that the security against other kinds of attacks (such as measure-resend attack,
disturbance attack, entangle-measure attack, etc. [9]) still holds.
In conclusion, we show that a dishonest student can cheat in the quantum
exam [9] and give a possible improvement by inserting some additional check
qubits in each sequence. We emphasize that the participant attack should
not be overlooked when we discuss the security of a MQKD scheme, which
generally possesses more power in eavesdropping than the attack from outside.
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